UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

2-6-2015

Krinitt v. Idaho Dept. of Fish and Game
Respondent's Brief Dckt. 42417

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"Krinitt v. Idaho Dept. of Fish and Game Respondent's Brief Dckt. 42417" (2015). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 5436.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/5436

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

PERRY KRINITT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
IDAHO DEPARTMENT OF FISH & GAME and
STATE OF IDAHO,
Defendants-Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

Appeal from District Court for the
Second Judicial District of the State ofldaho
in and for Lewis County
Honorable District Judge
Michael J. Griffin, Presiding

CHARLESH.CARPENTER

PETER J. JOHNSON

Carpenter Law Firm, PLC
210 N. Higgins Ave., Suite 336
Missoula, MT 59802

Johnson Law Group, P.S.
103 E. Indiana, Suite A
Spokane, WA 99207

Attorney for Plaintijf-Appellant

Attorney for Defendants-Respondents

FILED-COPY
FEB - 6 2015

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............................................. 1
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l

B.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

C.

FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW ................................................ 6

III.

ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

8

A.

INTRODUCTION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

B.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE RELEVANT LAW ............ 9

1.
2.

The District Court Properly Applied the Summary Judgment Standard.
Krinitt, Sr., Failed to Submit Evidence to Establish Essential Elements
of His Claim ...............................................
(a)
Duty ...............................................
(b)
Breach of Duty .......................................
(c)
Purely Speculative Issues of Fact are Not Appropriate
for Trial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

.9
10
12
13
16

C.

THE FINDINGS OFF ACT OF THE DISTRICT COURT ARE NOT BINDING. . ........ 18

D.

THE FACTS AND ALL REASONABLE INFERENCES WERE CONSIDERED IN
THE LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO KRINITT, SR. . ......................... 20

E.

KRINITT, SR., FAILS TO ESTABLISH THE REQUISITE ELEMENTS OF RES IPSA
LOQUITUR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

F.

KRINITT, SR., FAILS TO ESTABLISH THE REQUISITE ELEMENTS OF
NEGLIGENCE PER SE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF -

24

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Federal Cases
Bennett v. Parker, 898 F.2d 1530 (11th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1103,
111 S.Ct. 1003, 112 L.Ed.2d 1085 (1991) ........................................... 8
Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ........... 7, 8
Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network, 18 F .3d 752 (9th Cir.1994) .......................... 9
Lord v. Swire Pacific Holdings, Inc., 203 F. Supp.2d 1175 (D. Idaho 2002) ................ 9
Nelson v. Pima Cmty. Coll., 83 F.3d 1075 (9th Cir.1996) .............................. 21
Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2001) ........................ 9
Witherow v. Pa.ff, 52 F .3d 264 (9th Cir.1995) ....................................... 21

State Cases
Antlerv. Cox, 27 Idaho 517, 149 P. 731 (1915) ..................................... 12
Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 765 P.2d 126 (1988) ............................... 7, 10
Barlow's, Inc. v. Bannock Cleaning Corp., 103Idaho310, 647 P.2d 766 (Ct. App. 1982) .. 7, 29
Benz v. D.L. Evans Bank, 152 Idaho 215, 268 P.3d 1167(2012) ........................ 22
Bob Daniels & Sons v. Weaver, 106 Idaho 535,681 P.2d 1010 (Ct. App. 1984) ............. 7
Brizendine v. Nampa Meridian Irrigation Dist., 97 Idaho 580, 548 P.2d 80 (1976) ......... 22
C. C. Anderson Stores Co. v. Boise Water Corp., 84 Idaho 355, 372 P.2d 752 (1962) ....... 24
Christensen v. Potratz, 100 Idaho 352, 597 P.2d 595 (1979) ........................... 23

RESPONDENTS' BRlEF -

iii

Coombs v. Curnow, 148 Idaho 129,219 P.3d 453 (2009) .............................. 28
Cooper v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 45 Idaho 313, 262 P. 873 (1927) ................... 12
Dent v. Hardware Mui. Casualty Co., 86 Idaho 427,388 P.2d 89 (1963) .............. 10, 11
Dunnickv. Elder, 126 Idaho 308,882 P.2d 475 (Ct. App. 1994) ......................... 6
Eliopulos v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400, 848 P.2d 984 (Ct. App. 1992) ........................ 6
Enriquez v. Idaho Power Co., 152 Idaho 562, 272 P.3d 534 (2012) ...................... 23
Evans v. Bannock Cnty., 59 Idaho 442, 83 P.2d 427 (1938) ............................ 30
Evans v. Twin Falls County, 118 Idaho 210, 796 P.2d 87 (1990) ......................... 7
Finholtv. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894, 155 P.3d 695 (2007) ............................... 18
G&M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 808 P.2d 851 (1991) ............ 8, 9, 18
Garzee v. Barkley, 121 Idaho 771, 828 P.2d 334 (Ct.App.1992) ......................... 8
Heath v. Honker's Mini-Mart, Inc., 134 Idaho 711, 8 P.3d 1254 (Ct. App. 2000) ......... 6, 16
Hecla Min. Co. v. Star-Morning Min. Co., 122 Idaho 778, 839 P.2d 1192 (1992) ............ 7
Herrera v. Estay, 146 Idaho 674,201 P.3d 647 (2009) ................................ 27
Intermountain Business Forms, Inc., v. Shepard Business Forms Co., 96 Idaho 538,
531P.2dll83(1975) .......................................................... 7
Jerome Thriftway Drug, Inc. v. Winslow, 110 Idaho 615, 717 P.2d 1033 (1986) ............ 26
Johnson v. Gorton, 94 Idaho 595,495 P.2d 1 (1972) .................................. 7
Jones v. Starnes, 150 Idaho 257,245 P.3d 1009 (2011) ............................... 10
Macaw v. Oregon S. L. R.R., 49 Idaho 151,286 P. 606 (1930) .......................... 12

RESPO-NDENTS' BRIEF - iv

Magee v. Hargrove Motor Co., 50 Idaho 442,296 P. 774 (I 931) ........................ 30
lvfallonee v. State, 139 Idaho 615, 84 P.3d 551 (2004) ................................ 26
lvfcDonaldv. Paine, 119 Idaho 725,810 P.2d 259 (1991) .............................. 6
Nation v. State, Dep 't of Corr., 144 Idaho 177, 158 P.3d 953 (2007) ............... 10, 12, 25
O'Loughlin v. Circle A Constr., 112 Idaho 1048, 739 P.2d 347 (1987) ................... 25
Osier v. The Consumers Co., 41 Idaho 268, 239 P. 735 (1925) ......................... l 0
Owen v. Burcham, 100 Idaho 441, 599 P.2d 1012 (1979) ........................... 20, 22
O'Guin v. Bingham County, 142 Idaho 49, 122 P.3d 308 (2005) ........................ 10
Petersenv. Parry, 92 Idaho 647,448 P.2d 653 (1968) ................................ 18
Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., Inc., 92 Idaho 865, 452 P.2d 362 (1969) ........... 11
Ray v. Nampa School Dist. No. 131, 120 Idaho 117, 814 P.2d 17 (1991) ................... 6
Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho 42, 844 P.2d 24 (Ct. App. 1992) .................. 18, 22, 27, 29
SH. Kress & Co. v. Godman, 95 Idaho 614,515 P.2d 561 (1973) ....................... 23
Sanchez v. Galey, 112 Idaho 609, 73 3 P .2d 1234 ( 1986) .............................. 25
Sanders v. Kuna Joint Sch. Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 876 P.2d 154 (Ct. App. 1994) .......... 6, 18
Serv. Employees Int'! Union, Local 6 v. Idaho Dep't of Health & Welfare, 106 Idaho
756, 683 P.2d 404 (1984) ................................................... 25, 26
Shane v. Blair, 139 Idaho 126, 75 P.3d 180 (2003) ................................... 27
State v. Konechny, 134 Idaho 410, 3 P.2d 53 5 (Idaho Ct. App. 2000) .................... 28
Stewartv. Hood Corp., 95 Idaho 198, 506P.2d 95 (1973) ............................. 19

RESPONDENTS' BR1EF - v

IV.

G.

THE OPINIONS OF KRINITT, SR.'S EXPERTS STIMPSON AND GRANDY
WERE CONSIDERED BY THE DISTRICT COURT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

H.

THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT SCHIFF OPENED THE DOOR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

29

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 11

Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244, 985 P.2d 669 (1999) .............................. 12
Vickers v. Hanover Constr. Co., Inc., 125 Idaho 832, 875 P.2d 929 (1994) ................ 12

Other
I.R.C.P. 56(c) ................................................................. 6
I.R.C.P. 56(e) ................................................................ 18
I.R.C.P. 56(f) ................................................................. 6
Idaho Code § 67-5203 ......................................................... 26

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF -

vi

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant's Statement of the Case contains argument, unsubstantiated and inaccurate
statements, or statements not supported by the record. Respondents object to the Appellant's
inclusion of improper argument in his Statement of the Case but will respond to that argument in
the Argument portion of this brief. Respondents provide this statement of the case as to the nature
of the case, the course of the proceedings in the hearing below and its disposition, and a concise
statement of the facts.
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment awarded in favor of the State ofldaho and the
Department of Fish and Game (hereinafter "IDFG") because Plaintiff's theories ofnegligence were
solely based upon suspicion and speculation. R. Vol. II, p. 400. The district court granted summary
judgment because Plaintiff Perry Krinitt, Sr., (hereinafter "Krinitt, Sr." or "Plaintiff') failed to
present any admissible evidence to support the essential elements of his claim and he failed to show,
via depositions, discovery responses or affidavits, that there was a genuine issue of material fact for
trial. R. Vol. II, p. 398.

B.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY.

On August 31, 2012, Krinitt, Sr., filed an action in the District Court for the Second Judicial
District of the State of Idaho, Lewis County, seeking damages against IDFG stemming from the
death of his adult son Perry J. Krinitt (hereinafter "Krinitt") in a helicopter crash on August 31,

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 1

2010. Krinitt' s adult sister, Erynn Peralta, was initially a plaintiff in the action. However, her claims
were dismissed pursuant to a motion for summary judgment and that dismissal is not a part of this
appeal. R. Vol. I, p. 20-21.
Following substantial discovery, IDFG filed a motion for summary judgment on January 31,
2014, contending that Krinitt, Sr., had failed to produce any admissible evidence demonstrating that
IDFG employee Danielle Schiff (hereinafter "Schiff") was negligent or that her conduct was a
proximate cause of this tragedy. In his complaint, Krinitt, Sr., alleged that Schiff, who was an
occupant of the helicopter, became airsick and, as the helicopter approached Kamiah, Idaho, to land,
Schiff opened the door of the helicopter, lost control of her clipboard, and allowed it exit the
helicopter. R. Vol. I, p. 7. IDFG asserted, and the trial court agreed, that Krinitt, Sr., had not
produced any evidence that Schiff became airsick, that she opened the door of the helicopter, or that
she had control of the clipboard prior to it exiting the helicopter. The district court concluded that
Krinitt, Sr., had presented only suspicion and speculation as to what Schiff' s acts or omissions might
have been. R. Vol. II, p. 394-399.
After IDFG filed its motion for summary judgment contending that Krinitt, Sr., had failed
to present any admissible evidence in support of his allegations, Krinitt, Sr., responded with the
affidavits of two experts, Douglas Stimpson and Larry Grandy, and presented portions of the
deposition testimony of several witnesses. After realizing that he had no admissible evidence to
support his theory of what Schiff may have done to cause the clipboard to exit the helicopter, he
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modified his theory by arguing that however the door came to be open, Schiff had failed to keep the
clipboard in the cockpit and, for that reason, she caused the crash. R. Vol. I, p. 47. Oral argument
was held before Honorable District Judge Michael J. Griffin on May 30, 2014. Tr. 1. At oral
argument, IDFG responded to Krinitt, Sr. 's, new assertion, contending that, as with his previous
theory, the revised theory was factually unsupported and speculative and, therefore, insufficient to
create a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment. Tr. 7-8.
The trial court properly granted summary judgment on July 7, 2014, ruling that Krinitt, Sr.,
had not presented any evidence that the clipboard was in Schiff's possession prior to it exiting the
helicopter, that it was not known how or why the door was open, and that Krinitt, Sr., had relied only
upon speculation and suspicion to support his claim. R. Vol. II, 3 94-40 I.

C.

FACTS.

On August 31, 2010, Krinitt, an employee of Leading Edge Aviation, was the pilot of a
Hiller 12E Soloy helicopter contracted to transport IDFG employees Larry Barrett (hereinafter
"Barrett") and Schiff on a salmon survey along the Selway River. R. Vol. I, p. 7. Krinitt, Schiff and
Barrett met at Leading Edge Aviation in Lewiston, Idaho, that morning and the flight took off from
there. R. Vol. I, p. 7. Approximately 50 minutes after take off, the helicopter crashed in Kamiah,
Idaho. 1 R. Vol. I. p. 7. All three occupants sustained fatal injuries in the crash. R. Vol. I. p. 7.

The times of events vary somewhat between the various investigative reports ofthe accident,
the testimony of witnesses, and Plaintiffs Complaint for Wrongful Death. Therefore, the time of
the events are stated as they are stated in Plaintiffs Complaint, if they are contained in the
Complaint.
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Based upon the joint discovery conducted with the companion lawsuit, the parties learned
that the Hiller helicopter had undergone several modifications from its original configuration. R.
Vol. Supp., p. 467-468. Specifically, it had been modified from a four-seat configuration to a threeseat configuration. R. Vol. Supp., p. 467-468. In addition, the Hiller's standard doors had been
changed to "bubble" doors. R. Vol. Supp., p. 464. The latch system on the bubble doors was
different than on Hiller-manufactured doors. R. Vol. Supp., p. 463. Furthermore, the latch
mechanism on the right bubble door at the time of the crash was different than the latch that was on
the left door of the helicopter. R. Vol. Supp., p. 465-466.
Before this incident, both the left and right doors of the helicopter had a history of popping
open spontaneously. R. Vol. I, p. 150. The right door had popped open in the month before this
accident. R. Vol. I, p. 150. The door was adjusted to try to fix this deficiency. R. Vol. I, p. 150-151.
It is not known, however, what was done to try to fix the door. R. Vol. I, p. 150-15 l.

The helicopter left Leading Edge Aviation at 8:40 a.m. and crashed approximately 50
minutes later in Kamiah, Idaho. R. Vol. I, p. 7. At approximately 9:29 a.m., Krinitt radioed
StateCom and indicated that he intended to land in Kamiah. R. Vol. I, p. 7. No explanation for this
landing or further communication was ever received. R. Vol. I, p. 7. A few minutes later, the
helicopter crashed. R. Vol. I, p. 7.
At some point during the Hiller's approach to Kamiah, two witnesses observed that the rightside door was open. R. Vol. Supp., p. 445-449, 451-454. However, no one saw a person open the
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door. R. Vol. Supp., p. 445-449, R. 451-454. No one knows if this was the only time the door was
open during the approximately 50 minutes the helicopter was in flight. No one knows why the door
came to be open and no one can say how long the door had been open. R. Vol. Supp., p. 445-449,
4 78, 451-454. In fact, several individuals testified that this helicopter door had a history of popping
open on its own in the past. R. Vol. I, p. 152, R. Vol. Supp. 469.
No one knows exactly how or when the door came to be open, how or when the clipboard
left the helicopter, how or when the clipboard struck the tail rotor, or who had the clipboard in the
approximate 50 minutes the helicopter was in the air. R. Vol. Supp., p. 445-449, 478, 451-454; R.
Vol. II, 394-395. 2 No one saw the clipboard exit the cockpit. R. Vol. Supp, p. 445-449, 451-454.
The only testimony is that the clipboard had been last seen on the right-side seat of the helicopter
before the occupants entered the cockpit and the helicopter left Leading Edge Aviation. (See
Footnote 2). There is no testimony as to where the clipboard was in the 50 minutes the helicopter
was in flight. R. Vol. II, p. 225. There was storage space in the helicopter. R. Vol. I, p. 139. The
clipboard could have been behind a seat, in the door, on the floor, between the seats, or elsewhere.
R. Vol. II, p. 225, II. 9-17. In summary, there are no eyewitnesses who saw the door being opened
by Schiff or anyone else and there are no eyewitnesses who saw the clipboard exit the helicopter.

Atchison Deposition, pg. 83 (included in Certificate of Peter J. Johnson Regarding
Defendants' Response Memorandum, filed May 8, 2014). This deposition testimony was
inadvertently left out of the record on appeal, and is the subject of Defendants-Respondents' Motion
to Augment Record.
2
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II. ST AND ARD OF REVIEW

In an appeal from an order granting a motion for summary judgment, the Court reviews the
pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, to determine
whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact, and whether the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter oflaw. l.R.C.P. 56(c);Rayv. Nampa School Dist. No. 131, 120 Idaho 117,814
P.2d 17 (1991). This Court's standard ofreview is the same as the standard used by the district court.

McDonald v. Paine, I l 9 Idaho 725, 810 P.2d 259 (1991 ).
The party moving for summary judgment initially carries the burden to establish that there
is no genuine issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. Eliopulos

v. Knox, 123 Idaho 400, 404, 848 P.2d 984, 988 (Ct. App. 1992). The burden may be met by
establishing the absence of evidence on an element that the nonmoving party will be required to
prove at trial. Dunnick v. Elder, 126 Idaho 308, 311, 882 P.2d 475, 478 (Ct. App. 1994). Such an
absence of evidence may be established either by an affirmative showing with the moving party's
own evidence or by a review of all the nonmoving party's evidence and the contention that such
proofofan element is lacking. Heath v. Honker's Mini-Mart, Inc., 134 Idaho 711, 712, 8 P.3d 1254,
1255 (Ct. App. 2000). Once such an absence ofevidence has been established, the burden then shifts
to the party opposing the motion to show, via further depositions, discovery responses or affidavits,
that there is indeed a genuine issue for trial or to offer a valid justification for the failure to do so
under I.R.C.P. 56(f). Sanders v. Kuna Joint Sch. Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 154, 156 (Ct.
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App. 1994). It is critical to note that "evidence presented in support of or in opposition to motions
for summary judgment must be admissible evidence .... " Hecla Min. Co. v. Star-Morning Min. Co.,
122 Idaho 778,784,839 P.2d 1192, 1198 (1992).
IDFG acknowledges that on appellate review, the Court must construe the record favorably
to the party resisting summary judgment. E.g., Intermountain Business Forms, Inc., v. Shepard
Business Forms Co., 96 Idaho 538, 531 P.2d 1183 (1975). "However, this axiom does not blind [the

Court] to the difference between a factual showing and a bare allegation." Barlow's, Inc. v. Bannock
Cleaning Corp., 103 Idaho 310, 313-14, 647 P.2d 766, 769-70 (Ct. App. 1982). Specifically,

affidavits containing general or conclusory allegations, unsupported by specific facts, are not
sufficient to preclude entry of a summary judgment. Barlow's Inc., 103 Idaho at 314; see also Bob
Daniels & Sons v. Weaver, 106 Idaho 535, 541, 681 P.2d 1010, 1016 (Ct. App. 1984). A mere

scintilla of evidence will not suffice to create a genuine issue of fact. Evans v. Twin Falls County,
118 Idaho 210, 796 P.2d 87 (1990); Johnson v. Gorton, 94 Idaho 595, 495 P.2d l (1972).
Moreover, a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving
party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. Bade/! v. Beeks, 115 Idaho IO 1, 765 P.2d
126 (1988) (citing Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265
( 1986)). In this situation, the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law because the
nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of its case with
respect to which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct.
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at 2552-53. The language and reasoning of Celotex has been adopted by the appellate courts of
Idaho. See, e.g., G&M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514,517,808 P.2d 851,854 (1991).
This rule facilitates the dismissal of factually unsupported claims prior to trial. See Garzee v.
Barkley, 121 Idaho 771,828 P.2d 334 (Ct.App.1992); Bennettv. Parker, 898 F.2d 1530, 1532 (1 Ith
Cir.1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. l 103, 111 S.Ct. 1003, 112 L.Ed.2d 1085 (1991).

III. ARGUMENT
A.

INTRODUCTION.

There is no admissible evidence demonstrating Schiff s conduct was a proximate cause of
this tragedy. Krinitt, Sr., contends that there is a genuine issue concerning whether and why Schiff
opened the door and whether Schiff failed to maintain control of the IDFG clipboard, which conduct
caused the accident. Appellant's Brief, p. 33. Krinitt, Sr., argues that because Schiff was seated in
the right-side seat, she must have had the clipboard. R. Vol. II, p. 225. However, he has failed to
present any admissible evidence in support of these allegations. No one knows and there is no
evidence of how or why the door of the helicopter was open. No one saw a person open the door.
No one knows and there is no evidence as to where the clipboard was in the 50 or more minutes after
it was last seen on the seat of the helicopter before the occupants entered the helicopter. There is
no evidence that any conduct on the part of Schiff caused this accident. Krinitt, Sr., presents only
speculation and conjecture that Schiff felt ill and that she opened the door of the helicopter.
Likewise, he presents nothing more than speculation and conjecture that she had control of the

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF -

8

clipboard and that she failed to maintain control of it. Instead, Krinitt, Sr., offers a theory of
imagined conduct by Schiff which amounts to pure conjecture and suspicion. A claim of negligence
cannot rest upon guesswork, speculation or conjecture and, accordingly, summary judgment was
appropriate.

B.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY APPLIED THE RELEVANT LAW.

1.

The District Court Properly Applied the Summary Judgment Standard.

A motion for summary judgment must be granted by a district court "if the pleadings,
depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw. 11
I.R.C.P. 56(c). To withstand a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party's case must
consist of more than speculation, it must create a genuine issue regarding a material fact. G&M

Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho at 517. The district court is not required to accept as true
allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.

See Lordv. Swire Pacific Holdings, Inc., 203 F. Supp.2d 1175, 1178 (D. Idaho 2002); Cleggv. Cult
Awareness Network, l 8 F.3d 752, 754-55 (9th Cir.1994); Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266
F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001) opinion amended on denial of reh'g, 275 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001).
The district court considered all of the evidence submitted by Plaintiff in opposition to IDFG's
summary judgment motion, including the affidavits of his experts, deposition testimony and
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discovery responses. After doing so, it ruled that Krinitt, Sr., had failed to present evidence
sufficient evidence to establish a genuine issue of material fact.

2.

Krinitt, Sr., Failed to Submit Evidence to Establish Essential Elements of His
Claim.

In order to survive a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must "make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case on which that
party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Badell, 115 Idaho at 102. Thus, a plaintiff is required
to establish the existence of the essential elements ofnegligence in order to survive the motion for
summary judgment. Jones v. Starnes, 150 Idaho 257, 259-60, 245 P.3d 1009, 1011-12 (2011). A
cause of action for common law negligence in Idaho has four elements: ( 1) a duty, recognized by
law, requiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that duty;
(3) a causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss
or damage. Nation v. State, Dep 'to/Corr., 144 Idaho 177, 189, 158 P.3d 953, 965 (2007) (quoting

O'Guin v. Bingham County, 142 Idaho 49, 52, 122 P.3d 308,311 (2005)). Negligence is a fact to
be proven either by direct or circumstantial evidence and is not presumed on conjecture or
speculation. Osier v. The Consumers Co., 41 Idaho 268, 239 P. 735 ( 1925).
The Idaho Supreme Court discussed circumstantial evidence in Dent v. Hardware Mut.

Casualty Co., 86 Idaho 427, 388 P.2d 89 (1963):
[IJn discussing the question of the sufficiency of the record to sustain a judgment for
plaintiff in a negligence action, the majority opinion stated ...
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Circumstantial evidence is competent to establish negligence and proximate cause.
Facts, which are essential to a liability for negligence, may be inferred from
circumstances which are established by evidence. But, where circumstantial
evidence is relied upon, the circumstances must be proved, and not themselves
be left to presumption or inference. This court has held that inference cannot
be based upon inference, nor presumption on presumption.
The underlying principle applicable here is that a verdict cannot rest on conjecture;
that where a party seeks to establish a liability by circumstantial evidence, he must
establish circumstances of such nature and so related to each other that his theory of
liability is the more reasonable conclusion to be drawn therefrom; and that where
the proven facts are equally consistent with the absence, as with the existence,
of negligence on the part of defendant, the plaintiff has not carried the burden
of proof and cannot recover.

Dent, 86 Idaho at 433-434, (citations omitted) (emphasis added.)
As articulated by Dent, there is a vast difference between circumstantial evidence and pure
speculation. Krinitt, Sr., attempts to characterize speculations and unsupported conclusions as
circumstantial evidence. Asserting a possibility as "fact" and then theorizing circumstances which
are potentially consistent with this possibility, as he has done in an attempt to establish the alleged
negligent conduct by Schiff, is not sufficient to avoid summary judgment.
Flimsy or transparent contentions, theoretical questions of fact which are not
genuine, or disputes as to matters of form do not create genuine issues which will
preclude summary judgment. Neither is a mere pleading allegation sufficient to
create a genuine issue as against affidavits and other evidentiary materials which
show the allegation to be false. A mere scintilla ofevidence is not enough to create
an issue; there must be evidence on which a jury might rely. A popular formula is
that summary judgment should be granted on the same kind of showing as would
permit direction of a verdict were the case to be tried.

Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., Inc., 92 Idaho 865, 871, 452 P.2d 362 (1969).
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Idaho courts have long held that mere conjecture and speculation cannot be indulged in to
establish negligence or proximate cause. Cooper v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 45 Idaho 313, 262 P.

873(I927);Antlerv. Cox,27Idaho517, 149P. 731 (1915).
Proofofa bare possibility that an injury may be due to a given cause does not justify
a finding that it was so caused. The evidence must furnish some logical basis for a
finding that the result was probably due to the alleged cause .... Where the testimony
leaves the matter uncertain, it is not for the jury to speculate or guess that the
negligence of the defendant was the cause, when there is no satisfactory foundation
in the testimony for that conclusion. As quoted favorably by this court in Holt v.
Spokane etc. Ry. Co., 4 Idaho 443, 40 P. 56:

Every party to an action at law has a right to insist upon a verdict
or finding based upon the law and the evidence in the case, and
not, in the absence of the evidence, upon mere inference,
conjecture or personal experience.
Macaw v. Oregon S. L. R.R., 49 Idaho 151, 157-158, 286 P. 606 (1930) (emphasis added).
(a)

Duty.

Whether a duty of care exists is a question of law. Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244, 247,
985 P.2d 669, 672 ( 1999). "No liability exists under the law of torts unless the person from whom
reliefis sought owed a duty to the allegedly injured party." Vickers v. Hanover Constr. Co., Inc., 125
Idaho 832, 835, 875 P .2d 929, 932 (1994). Here, Krinitt, Sr., alleges that Schiff had a duty to prevent
the clipboard from exiting the helicopter. Appellant's Brief, p. 33. The duty element recognizes
that every person "has a 'duty to exercise ordinary care to prevent unreasonable,foreseeable risks
of harm to others."' Nation, 144 Idaho at 190-91. As the district court noted in its findings, James
Pope, (hereinafter "Pope") a helicopter pilot, owner of the helicopter involved in the crash, and
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owner of Leading Edge Aviation, testified in his deposition that prior to this accident Leading Edge
did not have any lanyards or tethering devices available to secure clipboards because they did not
recognize clipboards as a hazard. R. Vol. I, p. 140. Here the evidence is succinct and clear-not even
the helicopter owner, himself a pilot, recognized any hazards with clipboards. Nonetheless, Krinitt,
Sr., argues that Schiff had a duty to foresee a hazard not even recognized by an experienced
helicopter pilot and Leading Edge Aviation.

(b)

Breach of Duty.

Assuming, arguendo, that Schiff was required to foresee a hazard which the helicopter pilots
did not, Krinitt, Sr., must still present specific facts establishing that some action by Schiff breached
this duty. Krinitt, Sr.'s briefis replete with conclusory statements and imaginary conduct by Schiff,
but he does not cite to any evidence. His response to IDFG' s summary judgment motion relied upon
the affidavits and/or deposition testimony of Douglas Stimpson, Larry Grandy, and James Pope3 in
an attempt to show that there was a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Stimpson opined that: 1)
it is likely Schiff became nauseous (Appellant's Brief, p. 8); 2) Schiff"most likely" opened the door
of the helicopter (Appellant's Brief, p. 9); and 3) Schiff failed to control the clipboard (Appellant's
Brief, p. 10). Grandy opined that: "A likely reason for the exit of the clipboard was that Ms. Schiff
experienced significant nausea, opened the right cockpit door, and allowed the clipboard to exit the

The admissibility of the opinions of Stimpson and Grandy are addressed in later in
Respondents' Brief. However, for purposes of addressing Plaintiffs contention that he submitted
sufficient evidence to present a genuine issue of material fact for trial, their opinions are discussed.
3
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cockpit," and Schiff "did not maintain the required level of security" over the clipboard.
(Appellant's Brief, p. 33). To bolster these "opinions," Krinitt, Sr., offered the deposition testimony
of Pope who testified that Schiff had previously experienced motion sickness. (Appellant's Brief,
p. 40; R. Vol. I, p. 144.) He also presented evidence that there was a Sea-Band (anti-motion sickness
band) found in the wreckage. (Appellant's Brief, p. 40; R. Vol. II, p. 361-362.) However, the
testimony Stimpson relied upon to establish his opinion was dubious. Stimpson concludes that
Schiff was prone to airsickness based on his interpretation of Mike Atchison's deposition testimony
that at some point in time Atchison became aware that Schiff was prone to airsickness. R. Vol. II,
p. 214, II. 9-11. However, Stimpson failed to include in his report any other references in Atchison's
deposition that are did support this conclusion. R. Vol. II, p. 214, 11. 12-18. For example, Atchison
testified at deposition to the following:
•

"I don't know if she said she was prone to airsickness at the briefing or not." 4

•

"I don't have any evidence that she got sick." R. Vol. I, p. 59, II. 16-18.

•

"I don't recall exactly when she told me that." (Schiff getting airsick in the past.) 5

Atchison Deposition, pg. 96, II. 19-20 (included in Certificate of Peter J. Johnson Regarding
Defendants' Response Memorandum, filed May 8, 2014). This deposition testimony was
inadvertently left out of the record on appeal, and is the subject of Defendants-Respondents' Motion
to Augment Record.
4

Atchison Deposition, pg. 95, II. 25 (included in Certificate of Peter J. Johnson Regarding
Defendants' Response Memorandum, filed May 8, 2014). This deposition testimony was
inadvertently left out of the record on appeal, and is the subject of Defendants-Respondents' Motion
to Augment Record ..
5
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•

"[Y]ou asked me why I didn't document it [Schiff comment as to airsickness] in this

statement; is that correct? . . . I didn't believe I knew that at the time. I don't believe I did know that
at the time." (At the time of typing his statement the day after the accident.)6
"I don't know if I knew that she was prone to airsickness. You said prone to
airsickness. I don't know that she was prone to airsickness at that point in time or ifI found that out
later. I don't remember." 7
Contrary to the arguments of Krinitt, Sr., the affidavits and testimony he offered fail to
establish that Schiff did anything to cause this accident. The opinions proffered by Stimpson and
Grandy are nothing more than a story of imagined conduct on the part of Schiff. There is absolutely
no evidence as to whom the Sea-Band belonged; that Schiff felt ill; or that any person opened the
door.
The Idaho Court of Appeals has held that unsupported statements and opinions are
insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact to defeat a motion for summary judgment:
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56( e) governs the defense of a motion for summary
judgment, and states, in relevant part:

6
Atchison Deposition, pg. 96, II. 22-23, and pg. 97, II. 5-6 (included in Certificate of Peter
J. Johnson Regarding Defendants' Response Memorandum, filed May 8, 2014). This deposition

testimony was inadvertently left out of the record on appeal, and is the subject of DefendantsRespondents' Motion to Augment Record.
Atchison Deposition, pg. 97, II. 14-18 (included in Certificate of Peter J. Johnson Regarding
Defendants' Response Memorandum, filed May 8, 2014). This deposition testimony was
inadvertently left out of the record on appeal, and is the subject ofDefendants-Respondents' Motion
to Augment Record.
7
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When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that
party's pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) is identical to its federal counterpart and, thus,
we find federal law instructive to this Court's analysis of the issue at hand. It is not
the intent of F.R.C.P. 56 "to preserve purely speculative issues of fact for trial."
Exxon Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 663 F.2d 120, 128 (D.C.Cir.1980). A party
opposing summary judgment cannot demand a trial simply because of the
"speculative possibility that a material issue of fact may appear at that time." 1OB
Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller, Mary Kay Kane, Wright Miller & Kane,
Federal Practice and ProcedureE § 2739 at 388-89 (3d ed.1998). See Childers v.
High Society Magazine, Inc., 557 F.Supp. 978,984 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (an unsupported
statement that "it might not be so" was insufficient to raise a genuine issue of
material fact to defeat a motion for summary judgment). Moreover, it is well settled
that a mere scintilla of evidence or only a slight doubt as to the facts is insufficient
to withstand summary judgment. Corbridge v. Clark Equip. Co., 112 Idaho 85, 87,
730 P.2d 1005, I 007 ( 1986).

Heath, 134 Idaho at, 713-714.
(c)

Purely Speculative Issues of Fact are Not Appropriate for Trial.

The trial court correctly recognized the extensive speculation engaged in by Krinitt, Sr., and
found, among other things, that:
1.

Other than three occupants of the helicopter, the last person to see the clipboard

observed it lying on the seat where Ms. Schiff was going to ride more than 50 minutes before the
crash. See Footnote 2; R. Vol. II, p. 395.
2.

No one knows exactly how or when the clipboard left the helicopter and struck the

tail rotor. R. Vol. II, p. 397; R. Vol. Supp, p. 445-449, 451-454.
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3.

There is no evidence indicating who had control over the clipboard during the 50

minutes after the helicopter left Leading Edge Aviation or just prior to the door being opened. See
Footnote 2; R. Vol. II, p. 397; R. Vol. Supp, p. 445-449, 451-454.

4.

Krinitt, Sr., did not offer any facts to show that Schiff or Barrett had exclusive control

over the clipboard. The pilot was also in the cockpit and had access to the clipboard. R. Vol. I, p.
7; R. Vol. II., p. 397.
5.

The owner of the helicopter and a helicopter pilot, Mr. Pope, did not recognize the

clipboard as a hazard [R. Vol. I, p. 140] and it was not foreseeable having a clipboard fall out of this
helicopter and engage with the rear rotor. R. Vol. II, p. 397.
6.

There is no evidence that Schiff felt ill during this flight. R. Vol. II, p. 215-217; R.

Vol. II, p. 397.
7.

No evidence was found that anyone on the flight got sick. 8 R. Vol. II, p. 215-217; R.

Vol. II, p. 397.
8.

There is no evidence that the Sea-Band belonged to Schiff. R. Vol. I, p. 145; R. Vol.

II, p. 233; R. Vol. II, p. 397.
9.

There is no evidence that the clipboard was in Schiffs possession at the time when

the door opened. See Footnote 2; R. Vol. II, p. 397.

Krinitt, Sr., alleges that there may have been evidence that was destroyed but this argument
is nothing more than pure speculation and there was no motion before the district as to any evidence.
There is nothing in the record before this Court regarding this allegation.
8
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The district court, in considering summary judgment, viewed all facts in a light most
favorable to Krinitt, Sr., and drew all reasonable inferences from those facts in favor of him. G&M

Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho at 517; Sanders v. Kuna Joint School Dist., 125 Idaho at
874. To withstand a motion for summary judgment, Krinitt, Sr.'s case had to consist of more than
speculation. G&M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho at 517. Krinitt, Sr., was required to
submit more than just conclusory assertions that an issue of material fact existed to withstand
summary judgment. He was required to set forth, by affidavit or deposition, specific facts showing
a genuine issue. I.R.C.P. 56(e); Finholt v. Cresto, 143 Idaho 894, 896-897, 155 P.3d 695, 697-698
(2007). Krinitt, Sr., failed to meet this burden. Because a verdict cannot rest on speculation or
conjecture, (Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho 42, 46, 844 P.2d 24, 28 (Ct. App. 1992) citing Petersen v.

Parry, 92 Idaho 647,652,448 P.2d 653,658 (1968)), the district court correctly ruled that Krinitt,
Sr.'s claim was based only upon suspicion and speculation and, therefore, did not raise a genuine
issue for trial. R. Vol. II, p. 3 97.
C.

THE FINDINGS OFFACT OF THE DISTRICT COURT ARE NOT BINDING.

In his assignments of error, Krinitt, Sr., questions certain findings and conclusions issued by
the district court with the order granting summary judgment. The district court's findings did not
determine disputed issues of fact but only enumerated the extensive number of issues for which
there was no evidence and which were the subject of impermissible conjecture. The district court
found that there were no material issues of fact and that IDFG was entitled to summary judgment.
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Even if the findings were not as clearly articulated as they might have been, findings of fact in a
summary judgment motion are not binding on appeal. In that regard, Stewart v. Hood Corp., 95
Idaho 198, 506 P.2d 95 (1973) held:
Rule 52(a), I.R.C.P. expressly provides that findings of fact are not necessary in
deciding motions under Rule 56. As stated in 3 Barron & Holtzoff, Fed. Practice and
Procedure, (Wright ed. 1958) s 1242, pp. 201-202:
Logically, findings of fact should not be made in disposing of
motions for summary judgment. Findings are appropriate only in
deciding issues of fact. In granting a motion for summary judgment,
however, the court merely rules that there are no material issues of
fact and decides questions oflaw. In denying such a motion, the court
holds that there are material issues of fact to be tried, but does not
decide them. But despite logic, there is no objection to a court
making findings of fact if it wishes to do so, in granting a motion for
summary judgment. Such findings may well be helpful to the
appellate court in making clear the basis for the trial court's decisions.
Findings gratuitously made, however, are not entitled to the respect
which an appellate court is required to give findings made pursuant
to Rule 52(a).
In ruling on an appeal from a summary judgment the Court will only determine:
1.
2.

Whether there is a genuine issue as to any material fact; and
Whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Id., at 200.
It is clear from the record that the district court reviewed all the pleadings, depositions,
admissions on file, and affidavits submitted. R. Vol. II, p. 397-398. In reviewing all the evidence
submitted, the district court held that Krinitt, Sr., failed to present any admissible evidence to
establish any genuine issue of material fact. While the district court's issuance of findings were not
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required, they are helpful to assess the depth of the trial court's review of the materials presented
at summary judgment. However, they were not necessary, are not binding, and are not a basis for
reversing the district court's ruling.
D.

THE FACTS AND ALL REASONABLE INFERENCES WERE CONSIDERED IN THE LIGHT MOST
FAVORABLE TO KRINITT, SR.

Krinitt, Sr., argues that the district court failed to "heed fact disputes raised in [expert]
affidavits." Krinitt, Sr., also argues that had the district court "properly" applied the summary
judgment standard, it "was required to deny Fish & Game's request for summary judgment if there
was sufficient factual evidence from which a[n] ... expert could offer competent, fact-based
testimony ... " Appellant's Brief, p. 16-17. In actuality, Krinitt, Sr., argues that the district court
should have merely accepted the conclusions that Plaintiff offered without regard to whether they
were factually supported. This would lead to a result contrary to well-established Idaho law.
"There is no sure way to distinguish between a legitimate inference to which a party is
entitled and an unreasonable one which he is not." Owen v. Burcham, 100 Idaho 441, 448, 599 P.2d
l 0 12, l 0 19 (1979) (citations omitted). "It is well established [, however,] that an inference would
be unreasonable if it would permit a jury to base its verdict on mere speculation and conjecture."

Id. (citations omitted).
Krinitt, Sr.'s experts offered only guess and supposition as to what Schiff may have been
feeling or what she may have done. Not only that, the foundation upon which they based their
speculative conclusion that Schiff "most likely" opened the door was the speculation that she must
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have felt ill. There is absolutely no evidence that this was the case. Indeed, even that speculative
conclusion is based upon another speculation - that the Sea-Band found in the wreckage belonged
to Schiff. There is no evidence that this was the case. R. Vol. I, p. 145. Stimpson even stated in his
deposition that the NTSB information he relied upon for his conclusion that the Sea-Band belonged
to Schiff was an "inference": [The NTSB research didn't identify who the owner was] "by direct
knowledge. They did by inference." R. Vol. II, p. 211, II. 20-23. Finally, Krinitt, Sr., offered the
speculative conclusion that Schiff failed to medicate against motion sickness and that this was the
cause of the accident. It is axiomatic that mere allegation and speculation do not constitute evidence
which creates a factual dispute for purposes of summary judgment. See Nelson v. Pima Cmty. Coll.,
83 F.3d 1075, 1081-82 (9th Cir.1996) (citing Witherow v. Paff, 52 F.3d 264,266 (9th Cir.1995)).
Plaintiff's experts did nothing more than engage in pure speculation:
Other courts have also held that experts may not give "net" or conclusory opinions,
but only opinions which are substantiated by facts in evidence. McGlinchy v. Shell
Chemical Co., 845 F .2d 802, 806 (9th Cir.1988) (district court properly excluded
opinion testimony of expert who did not back up his opinion with specific facts,
rather his opinion was speculative, resting on unsupported assumptions); Theonnes
v. Hazen, 37 Wash.App. 644,681 P.2d 1284 (1984) (opinion of an expert must be
based on facts, and an opinion which is simply a conclusion or is based on an
assumption is not evidence which will take the case to the jury). [The admissibility
of expert opinion testimony] depends on the expert's ability to explain pertinent
scientific principles and to apply those principles to the formulation of his or her
opinion. Thus, the key to admission of the opinion is the validity of the expert's
reasoning and methodology. In resolving these issues, the trial court should not
substitute its judgment for that of the relevant scientific community. The court's
function is to distinguish scientifically sound reasoning from that of the selfvalidating expert, who uses scientific terminology to present unsubstantiated
personal beliefs.
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Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho at 46 citing Landrigan v. Celotex Corp., 127 NJ. 404,605 A.2d 1079,
1084 (1992).
While the non-moving party is entitled to the benefit of certain inferences, those inferences
must be reasonable. Reasonable inferences must be more than speculation and conjecture. See

Owen, 100 Idaho at 448. The district court was entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the facts
in the record, and was not required to adopt unreasonable ones. Benz v. D.L. Evans Bank, 152 Idaho
215,231,268 P.3d 1167, 1183 (2012). Consistent with this law, the district court concluded that
the speculation and conjecture of Plaintiffs experts were not sufficient to create a genuine issue of
fact to be determined by a fact finder.
E.

KRINITT, SR., FAILS TO ESTABLISH THE REQUISITE ELEMENTS OF RES IPSA LOQUITUR.

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is a way of establishing the element of breach in a
negligence action where no other evidence of a breach is available. Brizendine v. Nampa Meridian

Irrigation Dist., 97 Idaho 580, 583, 548 P.2d 80, 83 (1976). Res ipsa loquitur, if the doctrine is
applicable to the facts of a particular case, creates an inference of a breach of a duty by a defendant.
"Res ipsa loquitur leads only to the conclusion that the defendant has not exercised reasonable care,
and is not in itself any proof that he was under a duty to do so." Brizendine, 97 Idaho at 583, citing
Prosser, Law of Torts, s 39, p. 226 (4th ed. 1971).
A plaintiff seeking to invoke the doctrine ofres ipsa loquitur must show: (1) the defendant
exclusively controlled and managed the agency or instrumentality that caused the injury; and (2) the
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circumstances permit "an average layperson to infer, based upon common knowledge and
experience, that the plaintiff would not have suffered those injuries in the absence of the defendant's
negligence." Enriquez v. Idaho Power Co., 152 Idaho 562, 566, 272 P.3d 534, 538 (2012). For res
ipsa loquitur to apply it is "necessary that the cause of the injury point to the defendant's
negligence." S.H Kress & Co. v. Godman, 95 Idaho 614, 617, 515 P.2d 561, 564 (1973). In other
words, where the injury has other probable causes, a plaintiff must show the defendant was negligent
in some way. Enriquez, 152 Idaho at 566,272 P.3d at 538. The mere happening ofan accident does
not dispense with the requirement that the injured party must make some showing that the defendant
against whom reliefis sought was in some manner negligent, where there are other probable causes
of the injury. Christensen v. Potratz, 100 Idaho 352,355,597 P.2d 595, 598 (1979).
Given the clear requirements that Plaintiff must satisfy to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, i.e., that Schiff was in some way negligent and that Schiff had exclusive control of the
clipboard, Plaintiffs argument that the burden is on IDFG to show that res ipsa loquitur "cannot
possibly apply" is confusing. He cites no authority for this proposition.
Contrary to his argument, Krinitt, Sr., fails to meet any of the requisite elements for the
application of res ipsa loquitur. He did not establish that the clipboard was in the exclusive control
of Schiff. He fails to show that any conduct of Schiff' s caused this accident. His brief is wholly
inaccurate in its statement that: "The eyewitnesses agree that Schiff had the clipboard in the
cockpit". Appellant's Brief, p. 19. IDFG is unable to locate this testimony and Krinitt, Sr., does not
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cite to the record for this statement. The only testimony regarding the clipboard in the cockpit is that
of Mike Atchison who testified that he saw the clipboard on the right-side seat before the occupants
entered the cockpit more than 50 minutes before it crashed. See Footnote 2.
The district court correctly ruled that Krinitt, Sr., failed to meet the requirements necessary
to invoke the doctrine ofres ipsa loquitur. More importantly, Krinitt, Sr., is mistaken in his argument
that the burden is upon IDFG to show that the doctrine does not apply.
Res ipsa loquitur, where it applies, does not convert the defendant's general issue into
an affirmative defense. When all the evidence is in, the question for the jury is
whether the preponderance is with the plaintiff. Wherever the burden rests, he who
undertakes to carry it must do more than create a doubt which the trier of fact is
unable to resolve. This is but a particular application of the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur, which similarly is an aid to the plaintiff in sustaining the burden of proving
breach of the duty of due care but does not avoid the requirement that upon the
whole case he must prove the breach by the preponderance of evidence.
C. C. Anderson Stores Co. v. Boise Water Corp., 84 Idaho 355, 360, 372 P.2d 752, 754-55 (1962)

(citations omitted).
Krinitt, Sr., cannot meet any of the elements required to apply res ipsa loquitur and, thus, he
cannot rely on this doctrine to meet his burden to establish the breach of duty element of his
negligence claim.
F.

KRINITT,SR.,FAILSTOESTABLISHTHEREQUISITEELEMENTSOFNEGLIGENCEPERSE.

Krinitt alleges negligence per se on the part of IDFG because Schiff was permitted to
participate in the flight without having undergone in-person training in the three years prior to the
accident. Negligence per se, which results from the violation of a specific requirement of law or
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ordinance, is a question oflaw to be decided by the Court. O'Loughlin v. Circle A Constr., 112 Idaho
1048, 739 P.2d 347 (1987). "[I]n Idaho, it is well established that statutes and administrative
regulations may define the applicable standard of care owed, and that violations of such statutes and
regulations may constitute negligence per se." Nation, 144 Idaho at 190. Negligence per se does not
arise in the context of a common law duty. To replace a common law duty of care with a duty of
care based upon a statute or regulation, the following elements must be met:
First, the statute or regulation must clearly define the required standard of conduct;
second, the statute or regulation must have been intended to prevent the type of harm
defendant's act or omission caused; third, the plaintiff must be a member of the class
of persons the statute or regulation was designed to protect; and fourth, the violation
must have been a proximate cause of the injury.
Sanchez v. Galey, 112 Idaho 609,617, 733 P.2d 1234, 1242 (1986) (citations omitted).

In support of the negligence per se allegation, Krinitt submits the IDFG Regional Summary
of Procedures but fails to provide any authority that this internal policy can give rise to a cause of
action because of the violation of one or more of its provisions. This identical issue was addressed
in Serv. Employees Int'! Union, Local 6 v. Idaho Dep't ofHealth & Welfare, 106 Idaho 756,758,683
P.2d 404, 406 (1984). In Serv. Employees, the appellant urged that a provision in the Department
policy regarding employee grade violated rules of the Department contained in policies and
procedures manual. He argued that this manual had the force and effect of law. The question
presented was whether the Department's manual could give rise to a cause of action because of the
violation of one or more of its provisions. The Idaho Supreme Court held that the Department's
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policies and procedures manual, which was not promulgated pursuant to the procedural requirements
of LC. § 67-5203, did not have the force or effect oflaw, and therefore even if a violation of the
procedure set out in the manual had occurred, it could not be the predicate for a cause of action.
Serv. Employees, 106 Idaho at 759.
In addition, Krinitt, Sr., has failed to present any evidence that any alleged violation of the
internal policy ofIDFG was the proximate cause of this accident, i.e., he has produced no evidence
that any conduct of Schiff caused the accident:
Violation of an applicable statutory prohibition or ordinance constitutes negligence
per se, but the violation of the applicable statute or ordinance must be the proximate
cause of the injury of which the plaintiff complains. Here the evidence failed to
reveal the actual cause of the fire, but even assuming that the fire was caused by
electrical wiring, the wiring must have been in violation of a statute or ordinance.
Jerome Thriftway Drug, Inc. v. Winslow, 110 Idaho 615,618,717 P.2d 1033, 1036 (1986)(citations
omitted).
As with Serv. Employees Int 'l Union, the IDFG document must be construed as merely an
internal guideline, not having the force and effect oflaw, and thus not giving rise to a cause of action
based on an alleged violation. Serv. Employees, 106 Idaho at 759; see also Mallonee v. State, 139
Idaho 615,620, 84 P.3d 551, 556 (2004).
In summary, Krinitt, Sr. cannot rely on a theory of negligence per se to replace the common
law duty of care because he can point to no authority establishing that the internal IDFG procedures
manual is a statute or regulation. Thus, negligence per se does not apply.

RESPONDENTS" BRIEF - 26

G.

THEOPINIONS0FKRINITT,SR.'SEXPERTSSTIMPS0NANDGRANDYWEREC0NSIDERED
BY THE DISTRICT COURT.

It is clear from the record and the district court's findings that it did not grant IDFG's motion
to strike the affidavits of Douglas Stimpson and Larry Grandy. In fact, the district court referred to
opinions from these experts in its findings. R. Vol. II, p. 394. The admissibility of evidence under
I.R.C.P 56( e) is a threshold question the trial court must analyze before applying the rules governing
motions for summary judgment. Shane v. Blair, 139 Idaho 126, 128, 75 P.3d 180, 182 (2003). The
district court did so and obviously considered the affidavit and deposition testimony of these expert
witnesses. Herrera v. Estay, 146 Idaho 674,680,201 P.3d 647,653 (2009). Having admitted this
evidence, there was no need for the trial court to identify the evidence that it excluded, or the reasons
for it. Herrera, 146 Idaho 680. The district court's failure to issue a formal order denying IDFG's
motion to strike the experts' opinions is not reversible error.
Even with the admission of all of Krinitt, Sr.'s affidavits, deposition testimony, and
discovery responses; viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Krinitt, Sr.; accepting the
facts as alleged by Krinitt, Sr.; and drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom; the district court
ruled that the Krinitt, Sr.'s claims were based on speculation and suspicion and for that reason he
failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact. The district court issued findings of fact and
conclusions oflaw to summarize its analysis, although it was not required to do so. Therefore, any
failure to issue a formal decision on the admission of Krinitt, Sr.' s experts affidavits and testimony
was not material. Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho at 47 (holding that when the trial court fails to make
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a finding on a material issue, remand may be disregarded by the appellate court only when the
record is clear, and yields an obvious answer to the relevant question.)
IDFG maintains that the opinions of Plaintiffs experts were inadmissible because they were
based upon speculation; did not explain the pertinent scientific, technical or specialized knowledge
principles utilized; and did not explain how those principles were applied to formulate their
opinions, namely: that it was "likely" Schiffbecame nauseous, Schiff"most likely" opened the door,
Schiff had control of the clipboard, and Schiff failed to maintain control ofit. Krinitt, Sr., also relies
upon these"expert opinion" that even though there was no physical evidence that Schiff vomited,
"that doesn't mean that there wouldn't be a likelihood or possibility" that she did (R. Vol. II, p. 216217), and the belief of his expert that "it's most likely that the door was opened to get some air." R.
Vol. II, p. 222-223. These statements can only be viewed as nothing more than mere conjecture and
speculation as to how Schiff may have been feeling and what Schiffs actions might have been.
Secondly, admissibility depends on the validity of the expert's reasoning and methodology
rather than on his ultimate conclusion. Coombs v. Curnow, 148 Idaho 129, 140, 219 P.3d 453, 464
(2009). The Court's function is to distinguish scientifically sound reasoning from that of the selfvalidating expert who uses scientific terminology to present unsubstantiated personal beliefs. State
v. Konechny, 134 Idaho 410, 418, 3 P.2d 535, 542 (Idaho Ct. App. 2000). The requirements for the

admission of expert testimony are:
The evidentiary rules which govern the court's determination of admissibility include
I.R.E. 702, 703 and 403. Rule 702 provides:
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If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion
or otherwise. Thus, under Rule 702 qualified experts may testify in
the form of an opinion only if their specialized knowledge will assist
the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact in
issue. Because a verdict cannot rest on speculation or conjecture,
Petersen v. Parry, 92 Idaho 647, 652, 448 P.2d 653, 658 (1968),
expert opinion which is speculative, conclusory, or unsubstantiated
by facts in the record is of no assistance to the jury in rendering its
verdict, and therefore is inadmissible as evidence under Rule 702.
Other courts have also held that experts may not give "net" or conclusory opinions,
but only opinions which are substantiated by facts in evidence. McGlinchy v. Shell
Chemical Co., 845 F.2d 802, 806 (9th Cir.1988) (district court properly excluded
opinion testimony of expert who did not back up his opinion with specific facts,
rather his opinion was speculative, resting on unsupported assumptions); Theonnes
v. Hazen, 37 Wash.App. 644, 681 P.2d 1284 (1984) (opinion of an expert must be
based on facts, and an opinion which is simply a conclusion or is based on an
assumption is not evidence which will take the case to the jury).

Ryan v. Beisner, 123 Idaho at 46.
Plaintiffs experts merely disguise their personal opinions about what might possibly have
happened as "expert opinions." Krinitt, Sr., cannot avoid the law that affidavits containing general
or conclusory allegations, unsupported by specific facts, are not sufficient to preclude entry of a
summary judgment. Barlow's Inc., I 03 Idaho 310, 647 P.2d 766 (Ct.App.1982).
H.

THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT SCHIFF OPENED THE DOOR.

Krinitt, Sr., argues that: "None of the experts offered an opinion that the clipboard was in
the possession of the pilot immediately (or ever) prior to the accident. There was simply no
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evidence upon which such an opinion could have been based ... " Brief of Appellant, pg. 14. This
is true of all the occupants of the helicopter. There is simply no evidence upon which an opinion
can be based as to where the clipboard was.
There is no evidence as to how the bubble door of the helicopter became open. More
critically, there is absolutely no evidence that Schiff voluntarily or purposely opened the door while
the helicopter was in flight. Finally, there is no evidence that Schiff felt sick (R. Vol. I, p. 59) and,
as a result, voluntarily and purposely opened the door of the helicopter while it was in flight.
Again, Krinitt, Sr., has presented nothing more than speculation about how Schiff may have
been feeling and imaginary conduct by Schiff to support the allegation that she caused the accident.
Even at summary judgment, Plaintiff had the burden of proof to come forward with evidence to
establish that there was an issue of fact. It is not sufficient to merely show a possibility or raise a
suspicion that Schiff may have been negligent.

IV. CONCLUSION
A fact finder's province cannot be founded in speculation and conjecture. In order for a case
to proceed to a jury, the Plaintiff must produce more than guesswork. Krinitt, Sr., failed to meet his
burden to come forward with admissible evidence of material facts to support the essential elements
of his claim against IDFG. It takes some evidence, either direct or circumstantial, to take a case to
the jury. Evans v. BannockCnty., 59 Idaho 442, 83 P.2d 427,432 (1938); Magee v. Hargrove Motor

Co., 50 Idaho 442, 296 P. 774 (1931). Conclusions, inferences based upon inferences, speculation,
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and conjecture do not get a case to the jury. While certainly a tragedy, speculating that Schiff and,
thus, her employer IDFG, were to blame does not translate into a lawsuit.
DATED:

February 4, 2015.

JOHNSON LA W::GR.OUP//
Peter J. Johnson, ISBA #4105

Attorney for Defendants-Respondents
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I hereby certify that on this 4th day of February, 2015, two true and correct copies of the
foregoing were placed in an envelope, sealed and deposited into the United States Mail at Spokane,
Washington, with first class postage fully prepaid thereon, addressed to the following:

Charles H. Carpenter
Carpenter Law Firm, PLC
210 N. Higgins Ave., Suite 336
Missoula, MT 59802
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
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